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THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION AT COMMON LAW 
John H. Langbein* 
The appearance of the privilege against self-incrimination - the 
guaranty that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to qe 
a witness against himself" 1 - was a landmark event in the history of 
Anglo-American criminal procedure. Prior historical scholarship has 
located the origins of the common law privilege in the second half of 
the seventeenth century, as part of the aftermath of the constitutional 
struggles that resulted in the abolition of the courts of Star Chamber 
and High Commission. This essay explains that the true origins of the 
common law privilege are to be found not in the high politics of the 
English revolutions, but in the rise of adversary criminal procedure at 
the end of the eighteenth century. The privilege against self-incrimi-
nation at common law was the work of defense counsel. 
From the middle of the sixteenth century, when sources first allow 
us to glimpse the conduct of early modern criminal trials,2 until late in 
the eighteenth century, the fundamental safeguard for the defendant in 
common law criminal procedure was not the right to remain silent, 
but rather the opportunity to speak. The essential purpose of the 
criminal trial was to afford the accused an opportunity to reply in per-
son to the charges against him. Among the attributes of the procedure 
that imported this character to the criminal trial, the most fundamen-
tal was the rule that forbade defense counsel. The prohibition upon 
defense counsel was relaxed in stages from 1696 until 1836, initially 
• Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University. The Michigan 
Law Review was unable to consult certain sources that are cited to first editions in this essay. At 
indicates a citation for which the Michigan Law Review consulted a later edition or secondary 
source to verify the source information. - Ed. 
Throughout this paper, when drawing upon English and antiquarian sources, I have modern-
ized and Americanized the spelling, but not in the titles of books and pamphlets. A forerunner of 
this essay was presented at the 1991 annual meeting of the American Society for Legal History, 
and to a Yale Law School faculty workshop. I am grateful for suggestions from those learned 
audiences and for advice from Christopher Allen, Akhil Amar, Albert Alschuler, David Brown, 
Richard Friedman, Paul Gewirtz, Abraham Goldstein, Thomas Green, Richard Helmholz, 
Richard Lempert, Michael Macnair, and William Twining. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. v. 
2. In "the reign of Queen Mary ... the earliest trials of which we have detailed accounts took 
place .... " 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
319 (London, MacMillan 1883). 
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for treason, then for felony. Although persons accused of ordinary 
felony began to be allowed counsel in the 1730s, defense counsel did 
not become quantitatively significant until the 1780s. 3 
In the later eighteenth century and especially in the nineteenth 
century, a radically different view of the purpose of the criminal trial 
came to prevail. Under the influence of defense counsel, the criminal 
trial came to be seen as an opportunity for the defendant's lawyer to 
test the prosecution case. The privilege against self-incrimination en-
tered common law procedure (together with the beyond-reasonable-
doubt standard of proof and the exclusionary apparatus of the modem 
law of criminal evidence) as part of this profound reordering of the 
trial. It was the capture of the criminal trial by lawyers for prosecu-
tion and defense that made it possible for the criminal defendant to 
decline to be a witness against himself. 
As a convenient shorthand, and with apology for the inelegance of 
the terms, I shall contrast these two conceptions of the criminal trial 
as the older "accused speaks" theory and the newer "testing the prose-
cution" theory. So long as the older view of the purpose of the trial 
held sway, the defendant's refusal to respond to the incriminating evi-
dence against him would have been suicidal. Without counsel, the tes-
timonial and defensive functions were inextricably merged, and 
refusing to speak would have amounted to a forfeiture of all defense. 
The sources show that criminal defendants did not in fact claim any 
such self-destructive right. Until the later eighteenth century, for al-
most all criminal defendants, defending meant responding in person to 
the details of the accusation. Only with the ascendance of defense 
counsel did the "testing the prosecution" trial develop, and only then 
did it become possible to speak of a privilege against self-incrimination 
in common law criminal procedure. 
Part I of this essay discusses the several attributes of early modem 
criminal procedure that combined, until the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, to prevent the development of the common law privilege. Part II 
explains how prior scholarship went astray in locating the common 
law privilege against self-incrimination in the wrong events and in the 
wrong century. 
I. THE "ACCUSED SPEAKS" TRIAL 
In order for a privilege against self-incrimination to function, the 
criminal defendant must be in a position to defend by proxy. If the 
defendant is to have a right to remain silent that is of any value, he 
3. See infra note 96. 
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must be able to leave the conduct of his defense to others. By con-
stricting the use of defense witnesses and defense counsel, common 
law criminal procedure in the early modem period effectively closed 
off most avenues of defense-by-proxy. Undergirding the criminal pro-
cedure of the early modem trial at common law was a set of rules and 
practices whose purpose and effect were to oblige the accused to re-
spond to the charges against him. 
The "accused speaks" trial was already thoroughly entrenched in 
the 1550s and 1560s, when the historical sources first allow us to see 
how English criminal trials were conducted. In the treason trial of Sir 
Nicholas Throckmorton (1554), the plucky defendant complains of 
many aspects of the procedure to which he is subjected, but not about 
the incessant questioning from the bench and from prosecuting coun-
sel. 4 Sir Thomas Smith, in the notable Elizabethan tract, De Repub-
lica Anglo rum, 5 describes a hypothetical criminal trial held at 
provincial assizes about the year 1565. Smith depicts the defendant 
engaged in a confrontational dialogue with the victim and accusing 
witnesses, responding immediately to each new item of prosecution 
evidence. Functioning without the aid of counsel and speaking un-
swom, Smith's criminal defendant replies insistently to the question-
ing and to the testimony of his accusers. After the victim of a robbery 
testifies to his version of the events, then "the thief will say no, and so 
they stand a while in altercation .... " 6 This famous image of the 
accused and accuser "in altercation" about the events exemplifies the 
"accused speaks" trial, the trial whose purpose was to provide the ac-
cused an opportunity to explain away the prosecution case. 
A. Denial of Defense Counsel 
The bedrock principle of criminal procedure that underlay the "ac-
cused speaks" trial was that a person accused of serious crime7 was 
forbidden to have defense counsel. Various justifications were put 
4. "How say you, Throckmorton, did not you send Winter to Wyat into Kent, and did devise 
that the Tower of London should be taken ... ?" The Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 869, 872 {1554) (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C. 
Hansard 1816) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS]. "But how say you to this, that Wyat and you had 
conference together sundry times at Warner's house, and in other places?" Id. at 874. 
5. THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, bk. 2, ch. 23, at 114 (Mary Dewar ed., 
1982) (1st ed. 1583, written circa 1565). 
6. Id. 
7. The prohibition on defense counsel was a rule applied to treason and felony. The rule did 
not extend to misdemeanor. The main rationale for exempting misdemeanor from the prohibi-
tion was that some of what was prosecuted as misdemeanor was regarded as essentially civil in 
character - for example, the question of whether a property owner was responsible for main-
taining particular roadside ditches. See MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 51-55 
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forth for this rule. 8 
1. Court as Counsel 
It was dogma that the court was meant to serve as counsel for the 
prisoner.9 Alas, in many of the great political cases of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the behavior of the bench scarcely bespoke 
fidelity to the interests of the defendant. For example, Bromley, the 
presiding judge in Throckmorton's trial, joins the prosecuting counsel, 
Stanford, in urging Throckmorton to confess the charges, assuring 
Throckmorton that "it will be best for you."10 In John Lilburne's 
1649 trial, the presiding judge, Keble, having heard the prosecution 
case mounted by the attorney general but not yet having heard 
Lilburne's defense, announces to the jury: "I hope the Jury hath seen 
the Evidence so plain and so fully, that it doth confirm them to do 
their duty, and to find the Prisoner guilty of what is charged upon 
him." 11 Most of us would hope that our defense counsel could do 
somewhat better by us. 
The Tudor-Stuart bench had its own problems in this turbulent 
era. Until 1701, judges held office at the pleasure of the crown; 12 the 
(London 1619)t; see also J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 
339 & n.62 (1986). 
In the reform movement that ultimately led to the use of defense counsel in cases of serious 
crime, critics of the prohibition contrasted the liberty of defense that was allowed in civil litiga-
tion and in misdemeanor. "[W]hat Rule of Justice is there to warrant [the] Denial [of counsel], 
when in a Civil Case ofa Halfpenny Value the Party may plead either by himself or Advocate[?)" 
SIR BARTHOLOMEW SHOWER, REASONS FOR A NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (London 1692). Black-
stone wrote: "For upon what face of reason can that assistance [of counsel] be denied to save the 
life of a man, which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?" 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 355 (4 vols.) (Oxford, Clarendon 
1765-1769)t. 
8. Some of the discussion that follows is outlined in John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial 
Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 307-11 (1978). 
9. "[T]he Court ought to be ... of counsel for the prisoner, to see that nothing be urged 
against him contrary to law and right .... " EDW. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES 
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 29 (London, M. Flesher 1644) (posthumous publication, writ-
ten 1620s-1630s). 
10. Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 877. The same report dis-
closes: "Then the Chief Justice Bromley remembered particularly all the Depositions and Evi-
dences given against the prisoner, and either for want of good memory, or good will, the 
prisoner's Answers were in part not recited: whereupon the prisoner craved indifferency, and did 
help the Judge's old memory with his own recital." Id. at 897. 
11. John Lilburne, 4 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1269, 1382 (1649). Lilburne's defense 
does not change Keble's mind. After hearing Lilburne, Keble tells the jury that "you will clearly 
find that never was the like treason hatched in England." Id. at 1402. The jury disagreed. See 
infra note 131 for further discussion of Lilburne's 1649 trial. 
12. See Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 2, § 3 (1701). For background on the Act, see 
Barbara A. Black, Massachusetts and the Judges: Judicial Independence in Perspective, 3 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 101, 103· 12 (1985). 
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tradition of secure judicial independence lay in the future. Thus, re-
marked John Rawles in a famous tract published in 1689 after the 
overthrow of James II, the Stuart political trials had revealed that the 
judges "generally have betrayed their poor Client, to please, as they 
apprehended, their better Client, the King .... "13 
The judges safeguarded the interests of the accused more respon-
sibly in cases of nonpolitical crime. Because such trials go largely un-
noticed in the State Trials14 and other law reports of the period, what 
we know of these cases of routine crime comes mostly from the prob-
lematic pamphlet accounts of Old Bailey trials and Surrey assize pro-
ceedings.15 The ordinary criminal case lacked prosecution counsel as 
well as defense counsel. Accordingly, it was the task of the trial judge 
to help the accuser establish the prosecution case16 as well as to be 
"counsel for the defendant" in the peculiar and restricted sense being 
described. 
The defendant's supposed entitlement to have the trial judge serve 
as his defense counsel was limited to matters of law, not fact. "[T]he 
court ... are to see that you suffer nothing for your want of knowledge 
in matter oflaw," Chief Justice Hyde told a treason defendant in 1663, 
explaining the limits of the court's duty "to be of counsel with you." 17 
John Beattie captures the matter with great insight, observing that the 
idea that the court would be counsel for the defendant meant "that the 
judges would protect defendants against illegal procedure, faulty in-
dictments, and the like. It did not mean that judges would help the 
13. JOHN RAWLES, REMARKS UPON THE TRYALS OF EDWARD FITZHARRJS, STEPHEN 
COLLEDGE, COUNT CoNINGSMARK, THE LORD RUSSEL, COLLONEL SIDNEY, HENRY CORNISH 
AND CHARLES BATEMAN 22 (London, Jacob Tonson 1689), reprinted in TRYALS OF Lo. WM. 
RUSSELL & YE. RYE PLOTTERs (n.p., n.d.). 
14. On the provenance and contents of the State Trials, see Langbein, supra note 8, at 264-
67. 
15. The Old Bailey Sessions Papers are discussed id. at 267-72; see also John H. Langbein, 
Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 3-18 (1983). Regarding an equivalent series of pamphlet assize reports for the county of 
Surrey, see BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 23-25, 649-51 (discussing the Surrey pamphlets); see also 
id. at 99-106 (discussing murder trials reported there). The pamphlet reports originated as popu-
lar literature to entertain nonlawyers, and the accounts of the trials omit much of the detail that 
historians wish to know. 
16. "[T]he common practice clearly was for the judge to take [the victitn and any accusing 
witnesses] through their testimony line by line, acting as both examiner and cross-examiner, until 
he was satisfied that the fullest possible case had been presented." BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 342; 
see id. at 345 (commenting on "the judge's immense influence on the way the jury received the 
evidence and the impression it made on them," including his exercise of the power "to comment 
on the testimony as it was being given"). 
17. John Twyn, 6 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 513, 516 (1663). Jermin, J. put the matter 
quite differently, telling Lilbume from the bench that "the court are of your counsel so far as to 
fact," but that if a matter of law arises, "you may, and ought to have other counsel assigned." 
John Lilbume, 4 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1297-98. 
1052 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1047 
accused to formulate a defense or act as their advocates."18 Indeed, 
the idea of the court as counsel "perfectly expresses the view that the 
defendant should not have counsel in the sense that we would mean."19 
Consequently, "accused felons had to speak in their own defense and 
to respond to prosecution evidence as it was given, and as they heard it 
for the first time. If they did not or could not defend themselves, no 
one would do it for them."2° 
The judges did intervene on occasion to help the defendant in the 
realm of fact, mainly by cross-examining a suspicious prosecution wit-
ness when the defendant appeared ineffectual. But these initiatives 
were episodic and unpredictable. "Judges were only occasionally 
moved to engage in vigorous cross-examinations . . . . For the most 
part they took the evidence as they found it . . . . They certainly did 
not prepare in detail for examination and cross-examination; they 
were not briefed."21 Thus, although the judges had no reason to perse-
cute wrongfully accused persons, neither had the judges any particular 
incentive to be vigilant on behalf of defendants. In fact, the judges had 
a considerable incentive to conduct trials in a fashion that would not 
interfere with the orderly processing of their large criminal 
caseloads. 22 
2. The Accused as a Testimonial Resource 
The classic justification23 for deliberately denying the defendant 
any assistance of counsel in matters of fact appears in the second vol-
18. John M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & H1sr. REV. 221, 223 (1991). 
19. Id. (emphasis added). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 233. As late as 1827, a prominent judge-Baron William Garrow, who had come 
to renown as an Old Bailey defense counsel in the 1780s and 1790s, see id. at 236-47 - ex-
plained to a grand jury that, although the judges were counsel for the defendants, " 'they could 
not suggest the course of defence [that] prisoners ought to pursue.' " Id. at 254 (quoting 
Garrow). 
22. For discussion of criminal caseloads and caseload pressures on the bench, see BEATIIE, 
supra note 7, at 376-78; Langbein, supra note 8, at 274-78; Langbein, supra note 15, at 115-23. 
23. Sir Edward Coke tossed off a different rationale, a one liner about the standard of proof, 
which did not resonate in later discussions about denying defense counsel. He thought that "the 
testimonies and the proofs of the offense ought to be so clear and manifest, as there can be no 
defense of it." COKE, supra note 9, at 29. (I owe this reference to Michael Macnair.) The 
notorious Chief Justice Scroggs resurrected this idea in one of the Popish Plot cases, explaining 
that the accused was not entitled to counsel because "the proof belongs to [the crown] to make 
out these intrigues of yours; therefore you need not have counsel, because the proof must be plain 
upon you, and then it will be in vain to deny the conclusion.'' Edward Coleman, 7 STATE 
TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1, 14 (1678), cited in I STEPHEN, supra note 2, at 382. The idea that 
affirmative "full proor• precludes defensive disproof has a long history in continental procedure. 
See, e.g .• A. EsMEIN, HISTOJRE DE LA PROCEDURE CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE 146-47 (Paris, L. 
Larose et Force! 1882). 
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ume of Serjeant William Hawkins' hugely influential treatise, Pleas of 
the Crown, 24 first published in 1721. 
The defendant needs no counsel, wrote Hawkins, because, if the 
defendant is innocent, he will be as effective as any lawyer. "[E]very 
one of Common Understanding may as properly speak to a Matter of 
Fact, as if he were the best Lawyer .... "25 If the defendant is guilty, 
however, "the very Speech, Gesture and Countenance, and Manner of 
Defense of those who are Guilty, when they speak for themselves, may 
often help to disclose the Truth, which probably would not so well be 
discovered from the artificial Defense of others speaking for them. "26 
The words speak, speech, and speaking appear four times in this short 
passage, epitomizing in contemporary narrative the image of the "ac-
cused speaks" trial. 
Hawkins' insistence that the innocent criminal defendant enjoyed a 
comparative advantage in defending himself at trial is preposterous. 
Beattie describes the ineptitude of pathetic prisoners attempting to 
conduct their own trials: 
[M]en not used to speaking in public who suddenly found themselves 
thrust into the limelight before an audience in an unfamiliar setting -
and who were for the most part dirty, underfed, and surely often ill -
did not usually cross-examine vigorously or challenge the evidence 
presented against them. Not all prisoners were unprepared or tongue-
tied in court. But the evidence of the printed reports of assize trials in 
Surrey suggests that it was the exceptional prisoner who asked probing 
questions or who spoke effectively to the jury on his own behalf. 27 
As I have written elsewhere, "Hawkins' message is that it is desirable 
for the accused to speak, either to clear himself or to hang himself. "28 
Allowing counsel to meddle with the fact-adducing process would im-
pair the basic purpose of the trial: to hear the defendant speak, not to 
listen to "the artificial Defense of others."29 Hawkins was warning 
that the intermediation of counsel would threaten a fundamental 
premise of the criminal trial of his day - that the defendant should be 
routinely available as a testimonial3° resource. 
24. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London 1721). 
Volume 1 appeared in 1716. The book underwent seven editions through 1795 and an eighth in 
1824. 2 SWEET & MAXWELL'S COMPLETE LAW BOOK CATALOGUE 116 (1931). 
25. 2 HAWKINS, supra note 24, ch. 39, § 2. 
26. Id. · 
27. BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 350-51 (footnote omitted). 
28. Langbein, supra note 15, at 124. 
29. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
30. By "testimonial,'' I mean that the defendant spoke to the merits, even though, until the 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Viet., ch. 36, the defendant was forbidden from speaking 
on oath. Regarding the background of the English legislation of 1898 and corresponding Ameri-
can enactments, see Graham Parker, The Prisoner in the Box - The Making of the Criminal 
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The purpose of the rule denying defense counsel was, therefore, 
diametrically opposed to the purpose of the privilege against self-
incrimination. I touch here upon a deeper truth: The privilege against 
self-incrimination is the creature of defense counsel. The privilege 
could not emerge so long as the court required the defendant to con-
duct his own defense. In the "accused speaks" trial of the early mod-
em period, the testimonial function was merged with the defensive 
function. The right to remain silent when no one else can speak for 
you is simply the right to slit your throat, and it is hardly a mystery 
that defendants did not hasten to avail themselves of such a privilege. 
3. Restricting the Role of Counsel 
Even after the judges relaxed the prohibition upon defense counsel 
in the middle of the eighteenth century,31 they limited counsel's role in 
order to continue to pressure the defendant to speak at his trial. The 
judges permitted defense counsel to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, but they did not allow counsel to "address the jury" until legis-
lation authorized that step in 1836.32 
In 1777 a trial judge explained the practice of the day to a defend-
ant at the Old Bailey: "Your counsel are not at liberty to state any 
matter of fact; they are permitted to examine your witnesses; and they 
are here to speak to any matters of law that may arise; but if your 
defense arises out of a matter of fact, you must yourself state it to me 
and the jury."33 In an Old Bailey case two decades earlier, when the 
trial judge called upon the defendant to make his case at the conclu-
sion of the prosecution evidence, the defendant is recorded as saying, 
"My counsel will speak for me." Counsel at once corrects him: "I 
can't speak that for you, you must speak for yourself."34 
Evidence Act, 1898, in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRITISH HISTORY: PAPERS PRESENTED 
TO THE BRISTOL LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 156 (J.A. Guy & H.G. Beale eds., 1984); Joel 
N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical Survey, 70 KY. 
L.J. 91, 105-29 (1981-1982). 
31. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
32. 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 114 (1836) ("An Act for enabling Persons indicted of Felony to make 
their Defense by Counsel or Attorney"). 
33. Russen, OBSP (Oct. 1777)t, at 374, cited in Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Conten-
tious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 534 
n.183 (1990). · 
34. Murdock, OBSP (Oct. 1755, #377), at 333, 335t, extracted in Langbein, supra note 15, 
at 130. For another example, see id. at 130 n.516. Beattie reports an instance from Surrey 
assizes in 1752, in which the accused tries to leave his defense to his counsel, who declines it. 
The judge then explains: "Your counsel knows his duty very well, they may indeed speak for 
you in any matter of law that may arise on your trial, but cannot as to matter of fact, for you 
must manage your defense in the best manner you can yourself." BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 360 
(citing the case of Derby, Surrey Assize Proceedings (Lent 1752), at 2-11). 
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Thus, even with defense counsel on the scene, the English legal 
system of the mideighteenth century was telling the criminal defend-
ant that "you must speak for yourself." This aspiration to capture the 
defendant as a testimonial resource is perfectly understandable. He is, 
after all, the most efficient possible witness. Guilty or innocent, he has 
been close enough to the events to get prosecuted for the offense. 
Modem continental systems continue to emphasize the advantages of 
treating the accused as the central testimonial resource. 35 But this is 
not the conception of criminal procedure that we associate with the 
Anglo-American privilege against self-incrimination. It seems plainly 
contradictory to assert that there was a right to remain silent in the 
eighteenth century when eighteenth-century courts were routinely ex-
plaining, even to defendants who were represented by counsel, that 
"you must speak for yourself." 
B. Restrictions on Defense Witnesses 
The goal of pressuring the accused to speak in his own defense was 
achieved not only by denying or restricting counsel, but also by imped-
ing defense witnesses. As with the limitations upon counsel, these ob-
stacles to witnesses obliged the defendant to do his defending by 
himself - that is, by speaking at his trial. 
Throughout the seventeenth century the defendant had no right to 
subpoena unwilling witnesses. Indeed, in the sixteenth century there 
were prominent occasions on which trial courts refused to hear de-
fense witnesses who were present in court and willing to testify.36 
When defense witnesses were received, they were forbidden to testify 
upon oath, 37 although accusing witnesses were routinely sworn. The 
defendant always spoke unswom - he was forbidden the right to tes-
tify upon oath until 1898.38 
35. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 128 (1986); Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary 
Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. 
L. REV. 506, 526-30 (1973). 
36. Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 884-85; John Udall, 1 STATE 
TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1271, 1281, 1304 (1590). These cases are discussed in Peter Westen, The 
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 83 n.40 (1974); JAMES B. THAYER, A PRE-
LIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 158-59 (Boston, Little, Brown 
1898). 
37. See supra note 30. 
38. Coke, writing in the 1620s or 1630s, criticized the rule: 
And to say the truth, we never read in any Act of Parliament, ancient Author, Book case, or 
Record, that in Criminal cases the party accused should not have witnesses sworn for him; 
and therefore there is not so much as scintilla juris against it .... And when the fault is 
denied, truth cannot appear without witnesses. 
COKE, supra note 9, at 79. 
Coke pointed with approval to the act that provides for the trial in England of felonies com-
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I suspect that the authorities came to view these limitations on the 
use of defense witnesses as counterproductive, in the sense that the 
manifest asymmetry of facilitating prosecution witnesses while deny-
ing or hampering defense witnesses offended trial jurors. 39 Perhaps 
that is why John Lilburne, who was straining to provoke the sympathy 
of the trial jurors in his 1649 trial, insisted on the right to compulsory 
process that he knew was not allowed him. According to the State 
Trials report, Lilburne asks for "subpoenas" for witnesses, because 
some "are parliament men, and some of them officers of the army, and 
they will not come in without compulsion."40 
The Treason Act of 1696 granted compulsory process and allowed 
defense witnesses to be sworn, but only for treason cases.41 Legislation 
of 1702 allowed defense witnesses to be sworn in routine felony tri-
als. 42 The courts construed that legislation as impliedly authorizing 
compulsory process as well.43 
Thus, throughout the seventeenth century, the period during 
which the standard historical account supposes the development of the 
privilege against self-incrimination at common law, the rules of trial 
hampered the use of the alternative means of proof - those defense 
witnesses who would have been needed if the accused were to have an 
effective right to remain silent. 
C. The Standard of Proof Inchoate 
McCormick pointed out decades ago that the beyond-reasonable-
doubt standard of proof was not precisely articulated in English law 
until the last decade of the eighteenth century.44 Barbara Shapiro has 
mitted across the Scottish border and allows defense witnesses to be examined on oath "for the 
better information of the consciences of the Jury and Justice." 4 Jam. 1, ch. 1, § 6 (1606). The 
act is discussed in Michael R.T. Macnair, The Law of Proof in Early Modern England 238-40 
(1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, drawing on THE PARLIAMENTARY 
DIARY OF ROBERT BOWYER: 1606-07, at 300-63 (David H. Wilson ed., 1931)). 
39. Throckmorton, who was acquitted, seems, if the report can be credited, to have been 
trying to call the jury's attention to the unfairness of the court's excluding his witness. When the 
court refuses the witness, John Fitzwilliams ("Go you ways, Fitzwilliams, the court hath nothing 
to do with you; peradventure you would not be so ready in a good cause," Nicholas 
Throckmorton, 1 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 885), Throckmorton turns to the jury and says, 
"Since this gentleman's Declaration may not be admitted, I trust you of the Jury can perceive, it 
was not for any thing he had to say against me; but contrarywise, that it was feared he would 
speak for me." Id. On the defects of the State Trials in general and the Throckmorton report in 
particular, see G. KITSON CLARK, THE CRITICAL HISTORIAN 92-114 (1967). 
40. John Lilburne, 4 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1312. 
41. Treason Act of 1696, 7 Will. 3, ch. 3, §§ 1, 7; see infra text accompanying notes 84-92 
(discussing the Act). 
42. 1 Anne, stat. 2, ch. 9, § 3 (1702) (part of an omnibus criminal Jaw revision act). 
43. See the authorities collected in Westen, supra note 36, at 90 n.73. 
44. See CHARLES T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w OF EVIDENCE § 321, at 681-82 
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collected a good deal of authority showing that there were strong inti-
mations throughout the eighteenth century and e~lier that the trier 
should resolve doubts in favor of the criminal defendant. 45 Still, for so 
long as the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard lacked crisp formula-
tion, the imprecision pressured the defendant to speak. As Beattie ob-
serves of the eighteenth-century sources, 
if any assumption was made in court about the prisoner himself, it was 
not that he was innocent until the case against him was proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but that if he were innocent he ought to be able to 
demonstrate it for the jury by the quality and character of his reply to 
the prosecutor's evidence. That put emphasis on the prisoner's active 
role. He was very much in the position of having to prove that the pros-
ecutor was mistaken . 
. . . When the evidence had been given for the prosecution, the judge 
turned to the prisoner and said in effect: "You have heard the evidence; 
what do you have to say for yourself1" The implications of the judge's 
question were perfectly clear. When one [defendant on trial for larceny 
in Surrey in 1739] responded simply "I am no thief' and the judge told 
him "You must prove that," he was stating plainly the situation that 
every prisoner found himself in. 46 
Thus, the defendant, who already lacked counsel to probe the prosecu-
tion case, also lacked the protection of the modem judicial instruction 
on the standard of proof that encourages jurors to probe the prosecu-
tion case. The defendant had only one practical means of defense -
responding in his own words to the evidence and the charges against 
him. 
D. Hindering Defensive Preparation 
Most defendants accused of serious crime were jailed pending trial, 
and the conditions in the jails were appalling.47 Pretrial confinement 
interacted with the rest of the procedure to disadvantage the defend-
ant, effectively preventing the defendant from locating witnesses and 
& n.3 (1st ed. 1954). The beyond-reasonable-doubt formula appears to have been employed in 
Massachusetts in the 1770s. See Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of 
the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 516-19 (1975). 
45. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 1-41 (1991). 
46. BEATIIE, supra note 7, at 341, 349 (footnote omitted). 
47. On the wretched jail conditions in the eighteenth century, see id. at 288-309. "Gaols in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were notoriously decrepit - unfit to 'keep the prisoners 
free from wind and weather', as an Essex grand jury put it - and almost always overcrowded 
and insanitary." JAMES s. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH AsSIZES: 1558-1714, at 107 
(1972) (footnote omitted). For data on "prison mortality" in the suburban London jails, see 
JAMES S. COCKBURN, INTRODUCTION, CALENDAR OF AsSIZE RECORDS: HOME CIRCUIT IN-
DICTMENTS ELIZABETH I AND JAMES I, at 36-39 (1985) [hereinafter COCKBURN, CALENDAR] 
(noting there were 1291 deaths in the Home Circuit jails between 1559 and 1625). 
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developing his defense. 48 
The law also forbade the defendant from having a copy of the in-
dictment specifying the charges against him, not only in advance of 
trial, but even at trial. Instead, the court clerk summarized the indict-
ment to the defendant upon his arraignment. The Treason Act of 
1696 abrogated the rule against allowing the accused access to the text 
of the indictment, but only for cases of treason. 49 For ordinary felony 
cases, the rule endured throughout the eighteenth century,50 and it 
impaired the defendant's ability to prepare his defense with 
precision. 51 
Thus, the defendant was not only locked up, denied the assistance 
of counsel in preparing and presenting his defense, and restricted in 
obtaining defense witnesses, he was also given no precise statement of 
the charges against him until he stood before the court at the moment 
of his trial. The total drift of these measures was greatly to restrict 
defensive opportunity of any sort other than responding personally at 
trial to the incriminating evidence. This aspect of the procedure was 
not disturbing to contemporaries. Responding in person is just what 
Serjeant Hawkins' treatise insists the defendant ought to do, and just 
what the trial sources depict the defendant doing. The logic of the 
early modern criminal trial was to pressure the accused into serving as 
48. Speaking of the great state trials of the century before the Interregnum, Stephen wrote: 
The part of the early criminal procedure which seems to me to have borne most hardly 
on the accused was the secrecy of the preliminary investigation, and the fact that practically 
the accused person was prevented from preparing for his defense and from calling wit· 
nesses .... The one great essential condition of a fair trial is that the accused person should 
know what is alleged against him, and have a full opportunity of answering either by his 
own explanations or by calling witnesses, and for this it is necessary that he should have a 
proper time between the trial and the preparation of the evidence for the prosecution. 
STEPHEN, supra note 2, at 356-57. 
49. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, §§ 1, 9. The ostensible ground for this astonishing rule was to 
prevent the defendant from making assignments of error based on faulty Latin or comparable 
technicalities. When the Treason Act of 1696 abrogated the rule against granting the accused a 
copy of the indictment (for treason only), it imposed a quid pro quo: It precluded the defense 
from making assignments of error based upon indictment drafting defects unless the defense 
moved to quash the indictment in the trial court before the taking of any evidence. 7 & 8 Will. 3, 
ch. 3, §§ 1, 9. 
50. See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 24, at 402. For discussion of the practice from 1664 
into the early nineteenth century, see Douglas Hay, Prosecution and Power: Malicious Prosecu-
tion in the English Courts: 1750-1850, in POLICING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, 
at 343, 352 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder eds., 1989). 
51. Another practife that the Treason Act of 1696 eliminated, but only for the case of trea-
son, was nondisclosure of the venire, the list of prospective jurors, a step that would facilitate the 
exercise of the defendant's challenge rights. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 7. In cases of ordinary felony 
there was virtually no exercise of challenge rights. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 275-76; see also 
BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 340. Without counsel and the other aids in preparing one's defense, it 
is not surprising that nominal challenge rights were of little use. I suspect that the exercise of 
challenge rights by the ordinary felony defendant was regarded as an affront to the challenged 
jurors, who were commonly the social superiors of the accused, and that the defendant under· 
stood that he ought not to risk offending the remaining jurors by striking some of their peers. 
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a testimonial resource. It is difficult to imagine that a system so preoc-
cupied with obliging the accused to reply at trial could have been si-
multaneously intent upon constructing the counterprinciple that is 
embodied in the modem privilege against self-incrimination. 
E. The ''Accused Speaks" Theory in Pretrial Procedure 
A criminal trial is an occa.Sion for the consideration of evidence 
that has been previously collected. A truism of the study of criminal 
procedure is that the connection between pretrial and trial is intimate. 
We cannot understand the trial procedure of a legal system without 
knowing something about how the pretrial process collects evidence 
for trial. Likewise, to understand the pretrial we need to know how 
the agencies of trial will subsequently employ the materials that are 
being gathered in the pretrial. 
The Anglo-American tradition tends to be too trial-centered, per-
haps because of the drama of the criminal jury trial, and surely be-
cause of the importance that trial has had in landmark political cases. 
Yet, even in the Anglo-American systems, the everyday reality is that 
pretrial is vastly more important than trial. The evidence gathered 
determines many more outcomes than how it is subsequently 
presented. The trial is mostly a pageant that confirms the results of 
the pretrial investigation, and this truth is among the factors that ex-
plain why, when our criminal procedural system crumbled in the 
twentieth century under caseload pressures, our response was to dis-
pense with trial altogether, transforming the pretrial process into our 
nontrial plea bargaining system. s2 
The pretrial system that reigned in the second half of the seven-
teenth century - when, according to one historical writer, Leonard 
Levy, the privilege against self-incrimination "prevailed supreme"53 in 
the common law criminal trial - was antithetical to any such privi-
lege. By the midseventeenth century there had been in place for at 
least a century a system of pretrial inquiry that was devoted to pres-
suring the accused to incriminate himself. The Marian Committal 
Statute of 1555,54 whose origins and operation I have discussed exten-
sively elsewhere,55 required that a magistrate, called the justice of the 
peace (JP), should conduct a pretrial examination promptly after the 
52. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 
1 (1979). 
53. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF·INCRIMINATION 325 (1968). 
54. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 10, § 2 (1555). 
55. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 5-125 (1974). 
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defendant had been apprehended. The JP was customarily a local gen-
tleman active in civic affairs, not a career officer of the state.56 The 
Marian statute required the JP to transcribe anything that the defend-
ant said that was "material to prove the felony."57 The statute di-
rected the JP to transmit this document to the trial court, where it 
could be used in evidence against the accused. 58 The Marian statute 
also required the examining JP to bind over the victim and other ac-
cusing witnesses to attend the trial and testify against the accused. 59 
The emphasis on testimony against the accused was deliberate. The 
Marian JP was not the Continental juge d'instruction, not, that is, a 
professional judicial officer meant to gather evidence impartially. The 
Marian system was designed to collect only prosecution evidence. 60 In 
crimes of state, the Privy Council and the law officers of the crown 
conducted comparable pretrial investigations. 61 
In a prominent article published in 1949, the evidence scholar 
Edmund Morgan remarked on the tension between the Marian pre-
trial procedure and the supposed privilege against self-incrimination in 
the early modern period: 
56. Langbein, supra note 15, at 56-57. See generally JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY 
JUDGES 136-45 (1960); SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT: 
THE PARISH AND THE COUNTY 294-304, 319-446 (1906)t; Langbein, supra note 15, at 56-57. 
57. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 10, § 2 (1555). 
58. Sir Thomas Smith describes the Marian pretrial system circa 1565, indicating that the 
JP's written summary of the pretrial examination was routinely read in court at the criminal 
trial. SMITH, supra note 5, at 109, 113. A generally reliable manual of assize procedure dating 
from the Restoration period says that the JPs routinely surrendered their pretrial examination 
documents to the clerk of assizes, who studied each, "and if it be Evidence for the King, [the 
clerk] readeth it to the Jury." T.W., THE CLERK OF AsslZE 14 (London 1660)t, quoted in 
Langbein, supra note 15, at 82 & n.315. See id. for a discussion of this and other editions of the 
manual. 
By the mideighteenth century, the pretrial examinations were not being read at trial rou-
tinely, partly as a consequence of a "best evidence" notion that preferred the oral evidence of the 
victim and the other accusing witnesses, whom the Marian statute required the JP to bind over to 
testify at trial. The pretrial examinations continued to be available at trial for impeachment and 
for exceptional circumstances, such as the death of the victim or witness. In the early nineteenth 
century, Mac Nally was still emphasizing that "[t]he confession of the defendant himself, taken 
upon an examination, in writing, before justices of the peace, in pursuance of the statutes of 
Philip and Mary . .. is legal evidence against the party confessing." 1 LEONARD MAC NALLY, 
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN •37 (Philadelphia, Byrne 1811) (1st ed. 
1802)t. 
Regarding the strictures against allowing the accused's pretrial statement to be taken on oath, 
see infra note 142. 
59. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 10, § 2 (1555). 
60. Barlow's JP manual patiently explains that, while the examining JP ought not to sup· 
press evidence favorable to the accused when such evidence is part of the statement of a prosecu-
tion witness, the JP ought not to "examine Witnesses that expressly come to prove the Offender's 
Innocence." THEODORE BARLOW, THE JUSTICE OF PEACE: A TREATISE CONTAINING THE 
POWER AND DUTY OF THAT MAGISTRATE 190 (London, Lintot 1745). 
61. Pretrial depositions were used extensively at the subsequent trials - for example, the 
notorious early instance in Nicholas Throckmorton, I STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 869. 
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There was no thought of advising the accused that he need not answer or 
warning him that what he said might be used against him. The justice 
[who had examined the defendant in the pretrial] was often the chief 
witness at the trial of the accused and either used his record of the exam-
ination as the basis for his answers or read the record in evidence for the 
prosecution. 62 
Not until Sir John Jervis' Act of 184863 - that is, well into the age of 
modem lawyer-dominated criminal procedure - was provision made 
to advise the accused that he might decline to answer questions put to 
him in the pretrial inquiry and to caution him64 that his answers to 
pretrial interrogation might be used as evidence against him at trial. 65 
Until then, the accused was "expected to answer" the inquiries of the 
examining magistrate, "and, indeed, any refusal to answer, whether of 
his own initiative or on advice of another, was reported and stated by 
the magistrate in his testimony at the trial."66 
Thus, the pretrial procedure of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries was designed to induce the accused to bear wit-
ness against himself promptly. Having impaled himself at pretrial, the 
criminal defendant would find that any supposed privilege against self-
incrimination available at trial was worth little. If he declined to tes-
tify at trial, or attempted to recant upon his pretrial statement, the 
pretrial statement would be invoked against him at trial. Then as now, 
pretrial dominated trial. 
This systematic extraction of self-incriminatory pretrial statements 
bears upon the question of whether early modem English criminal 
procedure meant to recognize a privilege against self-incrimination. It 
seems odd to assert, as Levy does, that the privilege "prevailed 
supreme"67 at trial when the pretrial procedure was so resolutely or-
ganized to render any such trial privilege ineffectual. Remarkably, 
Levy was quite aware of the character of the Marian pretrial process. 
Levy's passage reads in full text: "By the early eighteenth century, the 
[privilege against self-incrimination] prevailed supreme in all proceed-
62. E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 & n.57 
(1949) (citing cases from the State Trials occurring in 1664 and 1682). 
63. 11 & 12 Viet., ch. 42. See generally David Freestone & J.C. Richardson, The Making of 
English Criminal Law: Sir John Jervis and His Acts, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. 5. 
64. Mac Nally reports Irish authority from as late as 1799 that there was no duty to warn. 
Chamberlain, J., an Irish King's Bench judge, sitting on assize "admitted in evidence, on an 
indictment for felony, the confession of the prisoner, taken by a justice of the peace, in an exami-
nation in writing, though it appeared, on the justice's admission, that he had not warned the 
prisoner of the legal consequences of his making such confession." MAC NALLY, supra note 58, 
at *38. 
65. See Morgan, supra note 62, at 14. 
66. Id. at 18. 
67. LEVY, supra note 53, at 325. 
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ings with one vital exception, the preliminary examination of the sus-
pect. In the initial pre-trial stages of a case, inquisitorial tactics were 
routine."68 "For all practical purposes," Levy concludes, "the right 
against self-incrimination scarcely existed in the pre-trial stages of a 
criminal proceeding."69 This is an important admission. Levy re-
quires us to believe that the seventeenth-century common law courts 
and their supporting political authorities created a self-evidently schiz-
ophrenic criminal procedure - that they enshrined a privilege against 
self-incrimination at trial while busily gutting it in the pretrial. 
F. Trial as a Sentencing Proceeding 
The sentencing practices of the later seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries were a powerful source of pressure on the defendant to speak 
at his trial. Our modem expectation is that sentencing occurs in the 
postverdict phase, after a separate trial has determined guilt. Further, 
even in jury-tried cases, we expect the judge alone to pass sentence. In 
former centuries, this division between trial and post-trial, and be-
tween jury and judge, was less distinct. The early modem trial jury 
exercised an important role in what is functionally the choice of sanc-
tion, by manipulating the verdict to select a charge that imported a 
greater or lesser penalty. A vestige of this power to mitigate the sen-
tence survives in modem practice, when the jury convicts of a lesser-
included offense, or when it convicts on fewer than all the counts that 
are charged and proved. 
The practice of selecting among convicted persons for the applica-
tion of diminished sanctions70 became characteristic of the eighteenth 
century as alternatives to the death penalty emerged. If the jury con-
victed a defendant of burglary, the punishment was death; but if, on 
the same facts, the jury convicted him of mere grand larceny, the sanc-
tion of transportation pertained. 71 Another example: The offense of 
picking pockets was capital if the jury valued the stolen goods at a 
shilling or more. If, however, the jury wished to rescue the convict 
from capital punishment and consign him to transportation, it could 
value the goods below the one-shilling threshold, for example, by find-
ing the culprit guilty of picking the victim's pocket "to the value often 
pence."72 
68. Id. 
69. Id. (footnote omitted). 
70. Precursors of this jury-operated system of mitigation can be traced back into the medie-
val common law. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 97-102 (1985). 
71. This is a main theme of BEATTIE, supra note 7; see especially id. at 450-519. 
72. Langbein, supra note 15, at 52. Another common exercise of jury sentencing power con-
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This practice of having juries "downcharge" or "downvalue" in 
order to mitigate the death penalty, immortalized in Blackstone's 
phrase as "pious perjury,"73 has been much studied in recent years. It 
is a main theme of John Beattie's great book, in which he uses the 
term partial verdict to describe these mitigating jury verdicts that con-
vict the defendant in a fashion that begets a reduced criminal sanc-
tion. 74 In a sample of London cases from the Old Bailey in the 1750s, 
I found that the juries returned partial verdicts in nearly a quarter of 
the cases.75 For a few offenses, like picking pockets, the juries all but 
invariably downvalued, expressing a social consensus that the capital 
sanction was virtually never appropriate. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum were a few property crimes, highway robbery being the pro-
totype, that were regarded as so menacing that juries virtually never 
mitigated the capital sanction.76 Across the broad range of property 
crimes, however, jury discretion held sway. In deciding whether to 
return verdicts of mitigation, "juries distinguished, first, according to 
the seriousness of the offense, and second, according to the conduct 
and character of the accused. " 77 
1. Informing the Jury's Discretion 
The jury's power to mitigate sanctions profoundly affected the pur-
pose of the criminal trial for those many offenses in which the jury 
might return a partial verdict. Speaking of the London practice in the 
1750s, I have elsewhere written: 
Only a small fraction of eighteenth-century criminal trials were genu-
inely contested inquiries into guilt or innocence. In most cases the ac-
cused had been caught in the act or otherwise possessed no credible 
defense. To the extent that trial had a function in such cases beyond 
formalizing the inevitable conclusion of guilt, it was to decide the 
sanction.78 
cerned the charge of grand larceny - that is, the theft of goods valued at a shilling or more but 
not alleged to be one of the aggravated forms of theft such as burglary or stealing from specially 
protected premises. In the eighteenth century, transportation was the prescribed penalty for 
grand larceny (a shilling and above), whereas for petty larceny (theft of goods worth Jess than a 
shilling) mere whipping was the usual sanction. Here, too, if the jury wished to impose the lesser 
sanction, it framed the verdict to downvalue the goods. Id. at 52-53. 
73. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 239. 
74. See BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 419-30; see also 1 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 83-106, 138-64 (1948). 
75. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 52. From a much larger sample of Surrey cases, includ-
ing lesser crime as well as felony, Beattie found comparable partial verdict rates (24.9%) in the 
period 1700-1739, then a decline to 12.7% for the period 1740-1779, and 7.5% for the years 
1780-1802. BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 419 n.32. 
76. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 53. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 41. 
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Because the main purpose of defending such a case was to present the 
jury with a sympathetic view of the crime and the offender that would 
encourage a verdict of mitigation, the criminal defendant labored 
under an enormous practical compulsion to speak in his own defense. 
Criminal procedure of this period effectively merged the guilt deter-
mining function and the sentencing function into a single proceeding, 
the trial The procedure foreclosed the defendant from participating 
in what was functionally his sentencing hearing unless he spoke at trial 
about the circumstances of the offense and of his life and character. 
To be sure, character witnesses could and did carry some of this bur-
den for the defendant in some cases; it was not impossible to remain 
silent and still obtain jury leniency. But it was a grave risk that few 
defendants had the stomach to undertake. 
The partial verdict system abated slowly, toward the end of the 
eighteenth century and during the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Our modem system of postverdict judicial sentencing arose in 
response to many factors. The movement to revise the substantive 
criminal law by consolidating and rationalizing the categories of of-
fenses invited the grading of sentences according to severity. This 
movement was deeply connected to the transformation of criminal 
sanctions, as imprisonment became the routine punishment for cases 
of serious crime. The older sanctions, death and transportation, had 
lent themselves to jury manipulation, because they came as "either-or" 
choices. The new sanction of imprisonment for a term of years was all 
but infinitely divisible. It invited the concept of the sentencing range, 
which effectively transferred from the jury to the judge the power to 
tailor the sentence to the particular offender. But, throughout the 
eighteenth century, the jury-driven system of mitigation by means of 
the partial verdict placed an enormous premium on the defendanes 
willingness to talk to the jurors at trial. 
2. Informing the Judge's Postverdict Review 
The trial judges exercised a postverdict discretion to recommend 
clemency to the crown. 79 In administering the pardon process, the 
judges depended upon information gleaned at trial for their view of the 
offender. A main reason that the judges discouraged80 guilty pleas in 
79. For discussion of the judicially dominated pardon process as a routine aspect of criminal 
procedure in the eighteenth century, see BEATIIE, supra note 7, at 430-49; RADZJNOWICZ, supra 
note 74, at 107-37; Langbein, supra note 15, at 19-21; John H. Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98 
PAST & PRESENT 96, 109-14 (1983). 
80. This issue is discussed with examples in Langbein, supra note 8, at 278-79. See also 
BEATIJE, supra note 7, at 336-37 & n.52, concluding: "Virtually every prisoner [in Beattie's 
Surrey sample for the years 1663-1802] charged with a felony insisted on taking his trial, with the 
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seventeenth- and eighteenth-century criminal trials was the wish to 
learn about the offender at trial in the event that a convict sought 
clemency. A Surrey assize judge sitting in a case in 1751 explained 
that he hanged a man who had pleaded guilty because the guilty plea 
had shut the judge "out from all evidence and circumstances favorable 
and disfavorable which might have appeared."81 Thus, the clemency 
aspect of the sentencing process reinforced the tendency of the jury 
mitigation system, placing the criminal defendant under further pres-
sure to speak at his trial. 
G. No Privilege Claimed in the ''Accused Speaks" Trial 
We have observed a host of reasons for doubting that the privilege 
against self-incrimination was in force in the later seventeenth and 
obvious support and encouragement of the court. There was no plea bargaining in felony cases in 
the eighteenth century." 
The tradition of discouraging guilty pleas was already ripe for mention in Sir Matthew Hale's 
History of the Pleas of the Crown, written sometime before the author's death in 1676. Hale says 
that "it is usual for the court ... to advise the party to plead and put himself upon his trial, and 
not presently to record his confession .... " 2 MATIHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS 
OF THE CROWN 225 (S. Emlyn ed.) (London 1st ed. 1736) (first edition, posthumous publica-
tion). Cockburn has documented an outbreak of plea bargaining on the Home Circuit for a 
period of three decades beginning in 1587, COCKBURN, CALENDAR, supra note 47, at 65-70, 105, 
but the practice appears not to have endured into the age of Hale and Hawkins. See also Neil H. 
Cogan, Entering Judgment on a Plea of Nola Contendere, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 992, 999-1016 (1975) 
(tracing some use of no/a-type pleas in early modern practice). 
So long as trial procedure remained informal and lawyer-free, an assize court or its London 
equivalent, the Old Bailey, conducted trials extremely rapidly, at the rate of a dozen or more 
felony jury trials per day. Sources treating criminal caseloads and the caseload pressures on the 
bench are cited supra in note 22. I report that "an average of twelve to twenty [felony] cases per 
sessions day went to jury trial" at the Old Bailey in the decades from 1678 onward. Langbein, 
supra note 8, at 277; see also id. at 274-78. Beattie reckons jury trial caseloads of about 15 felony 
cases per day at Surrey assizes in the second half of the eighteenth century, for an average trial 
time of about half an hour per case. BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 378. Hence, caseload pressures 
were not yet causing the courts to want to elicit guilty pleas. Rather, the courts repeatedly urged 
criminal defendants not to plead guilty. 
81. Quoted in John M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in Surrey: 1736-1753, in CRIME IN 
ENGLAND 155, 173 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977). See generally Beattie, supra note 18, at 232 (dis-
cussing "the importance of having the accused speak for themselves" and noting that "[i]t is this 
need for a trial - and a trial of a certain kind - that explains the extraordinary fact that judges 
did everything in their power in the eighteenth century to prevent the accused, especially those 
on capital charges, from pleading guilty"). What Beattie calls "a trial of a certain kind" is, I 
think, what I have been calling in this paper the "accused speaks" trial. 
The movement toward encouraging guilty pleas that is so familiar to us today in both English 
and American practice was, in my view, primarily a response to the complexity and time de-
mands of full-dress adversary jury trial. Little is known about the timing of this event. The 
ordinarily astute French observer, Cottu, who studied English practice in the post-Napoleonic 
period, says that it "often happens" that "the prisoner pleads guilty" because he is certain that 
the death penalty will be commuted; but that, even then, "the judge cautions him that the crime 
alleged is capital, and that it is his interest to defend himself; the clerk, the gaoler, almost all the 
counsel, even the prosecutor's persuade him to take the chance of an acquittal .... " M. Corru, 
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 73 (anon. trans., London, Rich-
ard Stevens 1822) (translating De !'Administration de la Justice Criminelle en Angleterre (Paris 
1820)). 
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eighteenth centuries, the period in which historical writers posit that 
the privilege "prevailed supreme" at common law. Denial of counsel 
and restrictions on defense witnesses and on defensive preparation left 
the typical defendant with little alternative but to conduct his own 
defense. The invasive Marian pretrial process, untouched by any sup-
posed privilege against self-incrimination, stacked the deck with self-
incriminating evidence for the trial. And a system of draconian crimi-
nal sanctions frequently operated to condition escape from the death 
penalty upon the defendant's contrite participation at trial. 
When, therefore, we examine the surviving evidence of how trials 
actually transpired in this legal system, we cannot be surprised to find 
that criminal defendants actually claimed no privilege against self-
incrimination. In a word, they sang. Fifteen years ago I pointed out 
that, in the pamphlet reports of London trials "from the 1670s 
through the mid-l 730s [where my study lapsed] I have not noticed a 
single case in which an accused refused to speak on asserted grounds 
of privilege, or in which he makes the least allusion to a privilege 
against self-incrimination."82 I have subsequently followed this set of 
pamphlet reports into the 1770s without finding any articulated claim 
to the privilege. 
Beattie, concentrating on Surrey sources for the years between 
1660 and 1800, makes a similar observation: "There was no thought 
that the prisoner had a right to remain silent on the grounds that he 
would otherwise be liable to incriminate himself .... " Indeed, "the 
assumption was clear that if the case against him was false the prisoner 
ought to say so and suggest why, and that if he did not speak that 
could only be because he was unable to deny the truth of the 
evidence."83 
H. Defense Counsel, Adversary Procedure, and the Privilege 
My theme in this essay is that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is an artifact of the adversary system of criminal procedure. Only 
when the modem "testing the prosecution" theory of the criminal trial 
displaced the older "accused speaks" theory did the criminal defend-
ant acquire an effective right to decline to speak to the charges against 
him. The historical bearer of the new criminal procedure was defense 
counsel, who crept into the ordinary criminal trial almost unnoticed, 
and who then worked a drastic procedural revolution with conse-
82. Langbein, supra note 8, at 283. But see the discussion infra in note 142 regarding sensi· 
tivity in the contemporary sources about not conducting pretrial examinations upon oath. 
83. BEATIJE, supra note 7, at 348-49. 
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quences that still reverberate through Anglo-American criminal 
justice. 
1. Allowing Defense Counsel 
The prohibition on defense counsel was first relaxed in the 
landmark Treason Act of 1696,84 the first comprehensive charter of 
defensive safeguard in the history of our criminal procedure. 85 During 
the 1690s, it came to be understood that the treason trials conducted 
under the regime of the later Stuarts had been grievously unfair. Espe-
cially during the dozen years from the Popish Plot trials of the later 
1670s until the Revolution of 1689, innocent persons of the politically 
significant classes had been convicted and had suffered traitors' deaths 
for want of the ability to defend effectively against baseless 
prosecutions. 
Defensive safeguard was a novel topic for English criminal legisla-
tion. The preamble to the Treason Act of 1696 announced the propo-
sition that persons accused of treason should be allowed "just and 
equal means for defense of their innocencies in such cases."86 The Act 
provided a package of reforms directed at eliminating many of the pro-
cedural disadvantages that undergirded the "accused speaks" trial. 
The Act allowed the accused a copy of the indictment five days in 
advance of trial; it granted the right "to advise with counsel" upon the 
indictment; and it spelled out the right at trial to make "full defense, 
by counsel"87 - meaning that defense counsel would be permitted not 
only to examine and to cross-examine, but also to sum up and to ad-
dress the jury about the merits of the defendant's case. 88 The Act 
granted the accused the right to have defense witnesses heard, the 
right to have them sworn,89 and the right to have them subpoenaed.90 
The grant of defense counsel in the Treason Act of 1696 was care-
84. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 1 (1696). 
85. See generally Alexander H. Shapiro, Political Theory and the Growth of Defensive Safe-
guards in Criminal Procedure: The Origins of the Treason Trials Act of 1696, 11 LA w & HIST. 
REV. 215 (1993); see also James R. Phifer, Law, Politics, and Violence: The Treason Trials Act of 
1696, 12 ALBION 235 (1980); Samuel Rezneck, The Statute of 1696: A Pioneer Measure in the 
Reform of Judidal Procedure in England, 2 J. Moo. HIST. 5 (1930). 
86. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 1. 
87. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 1. 
88. This step, allowing counsel to address the jury, was not taken for ordinary felonies until 
the legislation of 1836. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
89. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § I ("to make any proof •.. by lawful witness or witne!;ses, who shall 
then be upon oath"). 
90. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 7 ("to compel their witnesses to appear for them at any such trial 
or trials, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear against them"). 
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fully limited to treason trials, which occurred extremely rarely.91 
There was a sense that treason defendants were specially disadvan-
taged on account of the hostility of the bench. Because judges were 
subservient to the crown in prosecutions touching high politics, it was 
unrealistic to expect them to serve the supposed judicial role of coun-
sel for the defendant. Further, the denial of defense counsel had a 
special one-sidedness in treason cases, for the crown was invariably 
represented by counsel. By contrast, in cases of ordinary felony, pros-
ecution counsel appeared exceedingly rarely. The rationale for al-
lowing defense counsel in the Treason Act of 1696 was, therefore, to 
even the scales. 92 
Defense counsel entered the ordinary criminal trial in the 1730s, 
not as a result of legislative change, but through the exercise of judicial 
discretion.93 Something of the same "evening-up" rationale that lay 
behind the allowance of defense counsel in the Treason Act of 1696 
seems to have accounted for the decision of the courts to admit defense 
counsel in cases of ordinary felony. There appears to have been a con-
siderable increase in the use of prosecution counsel in the 1710s and 
1720s, 94 and "the resulting disparity may have influenced the judges to 
relax the [prohibition on defense counsel]."95 The use of defense coun-
sel remained a relative trickle for another half century, until the 
1780s.96 
2. The Adversary Dynamic and the Reconstruction of the Criminal 
Trial 
During the second half of the eighteenth century and continuing 
into the nineteenth century, our criminal procedure underwent that 
epochal change from the "accused speaks" trial to the modem "testing 
91. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 309-10 (discussing the reasons for restricting defense coun-
sel to treason cases). 
92. Sergeant Hawkins, defending the rule forbidding defense counsel to persons accused of 
routine felony, explained to his readers in 1721 that the Treason Act of 1696 allowed defense 
counsel in treason cases because "[e]xperience [had revealed] that Prisoners have been often 
under great Disadvantages from the Want of Counsel, in Prosecutions of High Treason against 
the King's Person, which are generally managed for the Crown with greater Skill and Zeal than 
ordinary Prosecutions." HAWKINS, supra note 24, at 402. 
93. Langbein, supra note 8, at 311-13. 
94. Suggested on thin evidence in id. at 311-12; substantially amplified by BEATIJE, supra 
note 7, at 352-56. 
95. Langbein, supra note 8, at 313; see also BEATIIE, supra note 7, at 359. 
96. The sources are not good enough to allow us to measure with precision how frequently 
defense counsel appeared in the eighteenth century. Beattie's cautious account points to the 
1780s. See Beattie, supra note 18, at 226-30. His calculations reckon percentages of defense 
counsel at the Old Bailey as low as 2.1 % in the 1770s, increasing to 20.2% in 1786, and to a high 
of 36.6% in 1795. Id. at 227 tbl. 1; see also Landsman, supra note 33, at 607. 
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the prosecution" trial. We have seen how relentlessly the earlier sys-
tem of trial pressured the criminal defendant to speak. Within the 
space of a few decades, the expectation that the accused would defend 
himself disappeared. Defense counsel made possible that remarkable 
silencing of the accused that has ever since astonished European com-
mentators. As early as 1820 an official French observer, Cottu, re-
ported back to his government that in English criminal procedure 
prosecuting counsel was "forbidden to question the prisoner . . . . In 
England, the defendant acts no kind of part: his hat stuck on a pole 
might without inconvenience be his substitute at the trial."97 
We do not yet have an adequate historical account of the stages by 
which this transformation occurred, and the historical sources are suf-
ficiently impoverished that we may never recover the events in ade-
quate detail. Nevertheless, the outline seems tolerably clear. Across 
these decades, defense counsel broke up the "accused speaks" trial. In 
these developments we find not only the beginnings of a new theory of 
the trial, but also the real origins of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The initial restrictions on the role of defense counsel at trial sug-
gest that his primary responsibility in the eighteenth century was 
cross-examining prosecution witnesses. Especially in cases involving 
reward seekers and crown witnesses, those shady figures whom the 
embattled London authorities sometimes employed to compensate for 
the English reluctance to institute professional policing,98 vigorous 
cross-examination often proved decisive.99 Thus, as Beattie remarks, 
defense counsel "began to shift the focus of the defense in a fundamen-
tal way by casting doubt on the validity of the factual case being 
presented against the defendant, so that the prosecution came increas-
ingly under the necessity of proving its assertions."100 There were sev-
eral strands to this development of the trial as the occasion for defense 
counsel to test the prosecution case. 
First, the concept that we now identify as party production bur-
dens came to be articulated. Prosecution and defense "cases" replaced 
the spontaneous "altercation" described by Sir Thomas Smith. 
Smith's defendant replied to each piece of prosecution evidence as it 
97. COTTU, supra note 81, at 105. 
98. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 84-114. 
99. See BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 361-62, 374-75; Beattie, supra note 18, at 233-35, 244. 
100. BEATTIE, supra note 7, at 375. Beattie has drawn attention to the daunting reputation 
of William Garrow as an Old Bailey defense counsel in the 1780s and 1790s. "[T]he greater 
participation of lawyers in criminal trials in the 1780s led not merely to more defendants being 
represented by counsel, but to a more committed advocacy of their cases in the courtroom and a 
new emphasis on their rights." Beattie, supra note 18, at 238. 
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was presented. When defense counsel came to prominence, the con-
cept of prosecution and defense "cases" developed - that is, the idea 
that the prosecution had to present all its evidence, and be subject to 
the defense counsel's motion for directed verdict101 at the end of the 
prosecution case, before the defendant would present rebuttal 
evidence. 
Second, towards the end of the eighteenth century the presumption 
of innocence - the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof - was 
formulated. 102 Coupled with the prosecutor's production burden, the 
beyond-reasonable-doubt standard encouraged defense counsel to si-
lence the defendant and hence to insist that the prosecution case be 
built from other proofs. 
Third, the law of criminal evidence formed in the later eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. "In their objections against the admis-
sion of certain kinds of evidence, and most especially by [their conduct 
of] cross-examination, defense counsel sought to limit the case their 
clients would have to answer." 103 With the increasing use of lawyers 
from the 1780s came lawyer's literature, especially the nisi prius re-
ports, upon which the evidence treatises of the early nineteenth cen-
tury would draw for sources.104 
Fourth, the growing use and effectiveness of defense counsel begot 
ever greater use of prosecuting counsel. The private associations for 
the prosecution of felons formed in great numbers from the 1770s and 
1780s.105 These complex organizations served a number of functions, 
but their central purpose was to defray the victim's costs of investiga-
tion and prosecution in certain classes of property offenses. 106 There is 
evidence for thinking that the surge in the formation of these groups 
reflects in part the need to prepare prosecution cases better, in order to 
deal with the new hazards of aggressive defense counsel as the "testing 
the prosecution" trial came to prevai1.107 
Fifth, the judge declined in importance as counsel for prosecution 
101. Noticed obliquely in Corru, supra note 81, at 98-99. 
102. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
103. Beattie, supra note 18, at 235. 
104. See WILLIAM TWINING, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in RE-
THINKING EVIDENCE 32 (1990) (discussing the development of treatise writing on evidence law); 
John H. Wigmore, A General Survey of the History of the Rules of Evidence, in 2 SELECT EssAYS 
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 691, 695-97 (Assn. of Am. Law Sch. ed., 1908) (empha-
sizing the role of nisi prius reporting). 
105. See David Philips, Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: Associations for the 
Prosecution of Felons in England, 1760-1860. in POLICING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-
1850, supra note 50, at 113-70. 
106. See John H. Langbein, Book Review, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 398, 402 (1991). 
107. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 128-29. 
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and defense took over the job of examining and cross-examining wit-
nesses. Cottu, the French observer writing in 1820, thought that pros-
ecution and defense counsel were typical in the practice of provincial 
assize courts, although not yet in London.10s He found that "the 
judge ... remains almost a stranger to what is going on,"109 content-
ing himself with taking notes and summarizing them for the jury at 
the end of the trial.110 
Finally, changes in the practice of jury control in this period, high-
lighted by Fox's Libel Act of 1792, 111 reflect the decline of judicial 
influence over the trial jury. Counsel's increasing control of the con-
duct of the trial was inconsistent with the older informal system of 
jury control that presupposed the casual intimacy of judge andjury.112 
Defense counsel silenced the criminal defendant in the second half 
of the eighteenth century for reasons of strategic advantage, as the 
logic of adversary procedure unfolded. Counsel welcomed the oppor-
tunity to pour this new wine into an old vessel, the maxim nemo 
tenetur prodere seipsum, the centerpiece of the traditional account of 
the history of the privilege against self-incrimination that is the subject 
of Part II of this essay. By the time that Bentham began complaining 
about the privilege against self-incrimination in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, 113 adversary procedure had become the norm. 114 
Defense counsel made the privilege against self-incrimination possible. 
Defense counsel disentangled the defensive and the testimonial func-
tions that previously had been merged in the hands of the defendant. 
By assuming the defensive function, and doing it within the structure 
of the adversary criminal trial, counsel largely suppressed the defend-
ant's testimonial role. Defense counsel must have been delighted to 
ascribe this radical reconstruction of the criminal trial to a centuries-
old maxim of soothing constitutional dignity. 
II. REVISITING A TROUBLED HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination at common 
108. Corru, supra note 81, at 88. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 88, 90. 
111. 32 Geo. 3, ch. 60. The Act completed the immunization of jurors who determined to 
return verdicts of acquittal in defiance of the applicable law. Such verdicts occurred infre-
quently, mostly in political cases. 
112. On the older patterns of jury control, see Langbein, supra note 8, at 284-300. 
113. See A.D.E. Lewis, The Background to Bentham on Evidence, 2 UTILITAS 195, 203-16 
(1990); A.D.E. Lewis, Bentham's View of the Right to Silence, 43 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 135, 
138 (1990). 
114. See supra note 96. 
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law has long been a murky topic. A main source of confusion is that 
the modem common law privilege came to be associated with a doctri-
nal tag, the maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, that developed in 
earlier centuries for quite different purposes. 
A. Antecedents to the Common Law Privilege 
1. Medieval Roots in European Law 
The Anglo-American adversary system repackaged doctrinal bag-
gage that started its journey in the medieval law of the Roman church. 
The maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, liberally translated as "no 
one is obliged to accuse himself," helped clarify the line between two 
spheres of Christian obligation. The believer's duty of penitential con-
fession did not entail instituting criminal proceedings against himself. 
He could confess sin to a priest without being obliged to confess pun-
ishable offenses to judges and prosecutors. 115 
In a very important article, Richard Helmholz has recently shown 
how prominently the nemo tenetur maxim appeared in the Continental 
sources of the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance. 116 He has es-
tablished that the nemo tenetur maxim influenced practice in the Eng-
lish ecclesiastical courts long before anybody in England started 
complaining about Star Chamber or the Court of High Commis-
sion.117 Helmholz's work, which has been confirmed in important re-
spects in an article by Michael Macnair, 118 delivers a devastating 
refutation of Leonard Levy's effort to portray the privilege against self-
incrimination as an English invention intended to protect the indige-
nous adversarial criminal procedure against incursions of European 
inquisitorial procedure.119 The concept that underlies the English 
privilege against self-incrimination originated within the European 
tradition, as a subprinciple of inquisitorial procedure, centuries before 
the integration of lawyers into the criminal trial made possible the de-
velopment of the distinctive Anglo-American adversary system of 
criminal procedure in the later eighteenth century. 
115. See R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the 
European lus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 982 (1990). 
116. Id. at 967, 970-72, 975-87. 
117. Id. at 969-89. 
118. Michael R.T. Macnair, The Early Development of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 66 (1990). The Helmholz and Macnair papers were published 
substantially contemporaneously and do not take account of each other. Macnair's main theme 
is that the privilege "came into English law from the common family of European laws and 
particularly the canon law." Id. at 67. 
119. The sources "stand directly at odds with Levy's depiction of civilian procedure as the 
implacable foe of the privilege and of English liberties. Indeed, the ius commune appears to be 
the very source of assertions of the privilege." Helmholz, supra note 115, at 974. 
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2. The Ex Officio Oath 
Chapter Two, as it were, of the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination is the saga of how the Puritans seized upon this concept 
of immunity from self-accusation as part of their struggle against 
Anglican religious conformity. The Puritans were resisting the efforts 
of Elizabethan (1558-1603) and early Stuart (1603-1640s) authorities 
to impose Anglican forms of worship. The ecclesiastical courts and 
the prerogative courts of High Commission and Star Chamber con-
ducted disciplinary proceedings of various sorts. These courts investi-
gated by means of the so-called "ex officio oath" procedure.120 When 
employing this procedure, the court instructed the accused at the out-
set of the inquiry that he should swear an oath to answer any questions 
that the court might subsequently put to him. A defendant who re-
fused to take that oath could be imprisoned for contempt or subjected 
to other harsh sanctions. Because these defendants were typically 
guilty of the nonconformist religious practices for which they were 
being investigated, they resisted submitting to ex officio oath 
procedure. 
Particularly towards the end of their contest with the ecclesiastical 
and prerogative courts in the 1630s, the Puritans placed considerable 
weight upon the nemo tenetur maxim, using it to stand for the claim 
that they ought not to be punished for failing to cooperate in ex officio 
oath proceedings. The Puritans sometimes succeeded in resisting ex 
officio oath procedure as it was applied in the ecclesiastical and pre-
rogative courts by obtaining relief from the common law courts. The 
common law courts issued writs of prohibition against some of the ex 
officio oath proceedings, often out of concern to limit subject matter 
encroachments upon common law turf. 121 
When political and military reverses forced Charles I to summon 
Parliament in 1641, Parliament sided with the Puritans, abolished the 
courts of Star Chamber and High Commission, and forbade the eccle-
120. See generally Mary H. Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio 
as Administered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, in EssAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL 
THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN 199 (Carl Wittke ed., 1936). 
121. In an important work correcting another side of Leonard Levy's book, Charles Gray 
has explained why it is mistaken to see this intervention as reflecting any consistent notion of a 
privilege against self-incrimination. Charles M. Gray, Prohibitions and the Privilege Against Self-
incrimination, in TUDOR RULE AND REVOLUTION 345 {Delloyd J. Guth & John w. McKenna 
eds., 1982). Reviewing the prohibition practice of the Elizabethan and Early Stuart period, Gray 
concludes that "[a]t the level of technical law ... a general privilege cannot be asserted." Id. at 
366-67. Although the common law courts imposed some restrictions, they "never said that juris-
dictions using civil-canon procedure could not expose individuals to self-incrimination." Id. at 
367. 
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siastical courts from using ex officio oath procedure. 122 These events, 
especially the fall of Star Chamber, remain among the most celebrated 
landmarks of English political and legal history. The idea that no one 
need accuse himself, whatever that meant, was part of this constitu-
tional triumph. As Henry Friendly observed, the precocious develop-
ment of this "procedural" protection against intrusive questioning 
reflected the primitive state of the substantive law concerning religious 
and political liberties.123 If the protections for nonconformist worship 
and for opposition political discourse that Americans now associate 
with the First Amendment had been more developed, Puritans and 
political mavericks would not have had to campaign as they did for 
procedural protections against self-incrimination in Star Chamber and 
High Commission.124 
B. Common Law Criminal Procedure 
The great question is how the common law courts came to inter-
nalize a privilege against self-incrimination. Why take a principle that 
had been developed to counteract the ex officio procedures of the ec-
clesiastical and prerogative courts and apply that principle to the radi-
cally different circumstances of common law criminal procedure? 
The historical literature, powerfully shaped by our pioneering 
scholar, Wigmore, 125 affords a long-familiar account of this develop-
122. 16 Car. 1, ch. 11 (1640) (revised at the Restoration as 13 Car. 2, ch. 12 (1661)). 
123. See Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional 
Change, 31 U. C1N. L. REV. 671, 696-98 (1968). 
124. Id. 
125. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2250, at 267 (John T. 
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). For convenience, I cite the 1961 edition of Wigmore's Volume 8, 
the so-called McNaughton revision, which is the currently available edition. As McNaughton 
explains, Wigmore's account of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination originated 
in two articles, John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1891), 
and John H. Wigmore, The Privilege Against Se/f-Crimination; Its History, 15 HARV. L. REV. 
610 (1902), and was then revised across the editions of the treatise. See 8 WJGMORE, supra, 
§ 2250, at 267 n.1. 
Wigmore worked before the vast outpouring of research on the history of criminal law and 
procedure that has been published since World War II. The later scholarship has materially 
altered and enriched our view of many of the subjects that Wigmore confronted unaided. Wig-
more worked almost entirely from the State Trials and the nominate law reports. He did not, for 
example, know the Old Bailey Sessions Papers, the extensive series of pamphlet trial "reports." 
See supra note 15. 
As a general matter, Wigmore tended to project the origins of the rules of evidence further 
back than the historical record reasonably supports. The modem law of evidence is largely a 
product of the period from the mideighteenth to the midnineteenth centuries. Geoffrey Hazard 
has indicated that the attorney-client privilege, which Wigmore dated to Elizabethan sources, 8 
WIGMORE, supra, § 2290, at 542-43, is effectively a product of the late eighteenth century. Cf. 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. 
REV. 1061, 1080 (1978). Wigmore places the modem hearsay rule in the late seventeenth cen-
tury. See generally John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437 
(1904), which is substantially reproduced in 5 JOHN H. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
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ment. The common law courts are said to have recognized the privi-
lege against self-incrimination in England in the middle of the 
seventeenth century, under the influence of the fall of the prerogative 
courts and the abolition of ex officio oath procedure in the ecclesiasti-
cal courts. 
According to Wigmore, John Lilbume's "notorious agitation" 
against the Star Chamber in the years between 1637 and 1641 
culminated in the statute of 1641, abolishing the two most controver-
sial courts, Star Chamber and High Commission. Then, "with a rush 
... the 'ex officio' oath to answer criminal charges is swept away with 
them." 126 Next - and this is the giant leap - Wigmore contends 
that the demise of ex officio oath procedure and of the prerogative 
courts that used that procedure affected the criminal procedure of the 
common law courts, by example. "With all this stir and emotion" of 
the fall of Star Chamber and High Commission and the suppression of 
ex officio oath procedure in the ecclesiastical courts, Wigmore writes, 
"a decided effect is produced, and is immediately communicated, nat-
urally enough, to the common law courts."127 
I recommend suspending judgment on how "natural" it should 
have been to expect the common law courts, which had never em-
ployed the ex officio oath, to recast their criminal procedure for the 
purpose of implementing a notion that the common law courts had 
until then asserted only as a corrective against the quite incompatible 
ex officio oath procedure of detested noncommon law courts. This 
development may seem "natural" in the powerful light of hindsight 
from the entrenched privilege against self-incrimination of our modem 
law, but, as I have emphasized in Part I, an array of structural attrib-
utes of common law criminal procedure would have made the privi-
lege unnatural and unworkable in the criminal trial of the later 
seventeenth century. 
Wigmore's pithy argument continues: "Up to the last moment [in 
John Lilbume's struggle against the Star Chamber in the years 1637-
1641, Lilbume] had never claimed the right to refuse absolutely to 
answer an incriminating question; he had merely claimed a proper 
proceeding of presentment or accusation. But now this once vital dis-
COMMON LAW§ 1364, at 12-28 (James H. Chadbourn rev., Little, Brown 1974) (1940) (based 
extensively on the State Trials). For indications that the supposed hearsay rule was ignored well 
into the eighteenth century, see Langbein, supra note 8, at 301-02. See also Beattie, supra note 
18, at 232. I treat this topic extensively in a forthcoming article, John H. Langbein, The Law of 
Evidence in the Eighteenth Century (Oct. 4, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
126. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 125, § 2250, at 289 (footnote omitted). 
127. Id. (emphasis added). 
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tinction comes to be ignored."128 Wigmore thus argues that contem-
poraries confuse¢ two notions - on the one hand, the hostility to the 
practice of the noncommon law courts, especially Star Chamber and 
High Commission, that had been requiring the suspect to swear in 
advance to respond truthfully to questions about religious beliefs and 
political leanings; and, on the other hand, the expectation that some-
one being tried following indictment for the commission of a particu-
lar crime in a common law court would respond personally to the 
charges and the evidence adduced against him. 129 
Whether, as a practical matter, "this once vital distinction" was or 
could have been ignored seems highly unlikely. Speaking of the great 
moment, from 1641 and thereabouts, when the prerogative courts fell 
and when Parliament proscribed the use of ex officio oath procedure in 
the ecclesiastical courts, Wigmore writes: 
It begins to be claimed, flatly, that no man is bound to incriminate him-
self on any charge (no matter how properly instituted) or in any court 
(not merely in the ecclesiastical or Star Chamber tribunals). Then this 
claim comes to be conceded by the judges ... even on occasions of great 
partisan excitement .... By the end of Charles H's reign [that is, by 
1685], there is no longer any doubt, in any court ... .13° 
Wigmore's follower, Leonard Levy, echoes this claim. "By the early 
eighteenth century," says Levy, the privilege against self-incrimination 
"prevailed supreme" in the common law criminal trial. 131 
128. Id. (footnote omitted). 
129. I am not alone in remarking on Wigmore's emphasis on serendipity in the common 
law's absorption of the privilege against self-incrimination. Macnair describes "Wigmore's clas-
sic account" as one that "saw the privilege as creeping in 'by indirection' into the common law in 
the mid-seventeenth century in the wake of the fall of Star Chamber and High Commission, [i.e.,] 
almost by accident." Macnair, supra note 118, at 66 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 125, 
§ 2250, at 292). 
130. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 125, § 2250, at 289-90 (footnotes omitted). In the concluding 
footnote, Wigmore cites the 17 cases that I discuss infra in the text accompanying note 134. 
131. LEVY, supra note 53, at 325. Levy tells what is, for practical purposes, a version of 
Wigmore's story. Levy singles out John Lilbume for adulation: "[M]ore than any other individ· 
ual [Lilbume] was responsible for the acceptance of the principle that no person should be com-
pelled to be a witness against himself in criminal cases." Id. at 313. 
In truth, Lilbume was an insignificant figure in the development of the privilege. Lilburne 
was prosecuted criminally on several occasions over the years from the first proceedings against 
him in the Star Chamber under Charles I, 3 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1315 (1637), to his 
last common Jaw trial in the Commonwealth period, 5 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 407 
(1653). Lilburne's reputation derives mainly from his spirited defense to treason charges brought 
against him during the Commonwealth period at a common law trial convened in 1649; the trial 
is extensively reported in 4 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1269 (1649). Lilbume raised two 
important themes in his defense - the need for defense counsel and the jury's power to engage in 
law nullifying- themes that would have a robust future. Lilbume complained incessantly about 
being denied the opportunity to consult counsel, id. at 1293-318, 1329-30, 1373-79, 1394-95, 
1404, and he asserted the claim that juries are judges of law and fact. See, e.g., id. at 1379-81. 
The latter aspect of Lilbume's defense in the 1649 trial has been meticulously studied and related 
to the surrounding tract literature in GREEN, supra note 70, at 153-99. 
Compared to these insistent themes of the trial, Lilbume's mention of the maxim about not 
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Having explained in Part I why this familiar account132 of the ap-
pearance of the privilege against self-incrimination at common law is 
so improbable, I tum now to examine the sources that led Wigmore 
astray. 
C. Wigmore's Sources 
What, precisely, is the historical evidence that Wigmore adduces 
for his proposition that the common law privilege was broadly ac-
cepted ("no longer any doubt, in any court"133) by the 1680s? It con-
sists of a forbiddingly long, double-column footnote, in which 
Wigmore collects citations to seventeen reported cases. 134 These au-
thorities tum out to supply weak support for Wigmore's proposition. 
having to be a witness against oneself was quite peripheral. According to the verbatim of the 
State Trials report, Lilburne adverts to the idea twice. First, at the arraignment, not the trial, 
hence in a setting not strictly relevant to trial procedure, Lilburne announces that "by the Laws 
of England, I am not to answer to questions against or concerning myself." 4 STATE TRIALS, 
supra note 4, at 1292. Keble, J., presiding, plays along, telling him, "You shall not be com-
pelled." Id. at 1293. 
Second, during the course of the trial, Keble has a handwritten document exhibited to 
Lilburne and asks him to acknowledge the handwriting. Lilburne refuses, saying he will not look 
at prosecution papers, "neither shall I answer to any questions that concern myself." Id. at 1340. 
A witness thereupon testified to Lilburne's authorship, which made it inconsequential that 
Lilburne had declined to stipulate to the point. Lilburne, however, linked up his refusal to an-
swer the question with his larger strategy, which was to put the prosecution to its proofs. "I have 
said, Sir, prove it." Id. The exchange with Lilburne continues in this vein, the attorney general 
chiding him for not acknowledging his hand, Lilburne saying, "Sir, I deny nothing ... but prove 
it first." Id. at 1341. Again: "I shall deny nothing I do. And yet I have read the Petition of 
Right, Sir, that teaches me to answer to no questions against or concerning myself, and I have 
read of the same to be practiced by Christ and his Apostles." Id. Lilburne was drawing not so 
much on the notion of a privilege against self-incrimination as upon the nascent concept of the 
prosecutor's burden of proof. 
In this respect, Lilburne's claim was truly precocious, and it shows how the newer theory of 
the trial always lay close to the surface in the old. The old "accused speaks" trial could easily be 
converted to the "test the prosecution" trial if the defendant were willing to risk it. If this had 
been a homicide or a theft, the defendant would have hanged himself with these tactics. 
Lilburne's ploy was designed to put the prosecution on trial, and - without counsel - that risk 
could be taken only in a political case when the defendant had reason to suspect that he could 
evoke the sympathy of the jury. 
Apart from these two asides, Lilburne responded at his trial to prosecution evidence and 
prosecution questioning as did other defendants of the age. For example, "I shall proceed on to 
answer your Proof to the Indictment .... " Id. at 1382. "In answer to whose testimony I return 
this .... " Id. at 1382. "[A]nd therefore I can answer to that nothing more than what I have 
said already." Id. at 1388. About certain books, he notes "I do not own [i.e., admit] a jot, a line, 
a word, a syllable of any one of them." Id. at 1389. "I hope I have so clearly and fully answered 
all and every of your proofs, that not any one thing sticks." Id. This behavior is quite difficult to 
reconcile with Levy's claim that Lilburne was insisting on a privilege against self-incrimination. 
In truth, like every other defendant of the age before defense counsel, Lilburne was obliged to 
defend himself in ways quite inconsistent with a privilege to remain silent. 
132. See, for example, the compacted version ofWigmore's account in the leading textbook, 
CHARLES T. McCORMICK, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 114, at 424 (John w. Strong ed., 4th 
ed. 1992). 
133. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 125, § 2250, at 290. 
134. Id. at 290 n.105. 
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1. Civil Cases 
Five of the seventeen cases are civil cases and thus wholly inappo-
site. Four of these civil cases are from the court of Chancery. The 
parties were disputing whether discovery or other relief should be re-
fused upon the basis of the familiar maxim of equitable jurisdiction 
that equity will not enforce a penalty or a forfeiture. 135 The other civil 
case applies a similar principle to a prohibition action that was pend-
ing in a duchy court. 136 
2. Criminal Cases 
The dozen remaining cases come from the State Trials and involve 
politically significant criminal charges. One is the report of a pretrial 
investigation that was dropped without trial. 137 The remaining eleven 
involve criminal trials. In each, the defendant spoke vigorously and 
persistently to the merits in his own defense. What Wigmore identifies 
as evidence of the defendant invoking the privilege against self-incrim-
ination is an isolated remark or exchange that occurs in a trial in 
which the defendant otherwise speaks constantly, utterly disregarding 
135. African Co. v. Parish, 2 Vern. 244, 23 Eng. Rep. 758 (Ch. 1691); Bird v. Hardwicke, 1 
Vern. 109, 23 Eng. Rep. 349 (Ch. 1682); Anon., 1Vern.60, 23 Eng. Rep. 310 (Ch. 1682); Penrice 
v. Parker, Rep. Temp Finch 75, 23 Eng. Rep. 40 (Ch. 1673). 
For the flavor of these cases, consider the last, African Co. v. Parish, 2 Vern. 244, 23 Eng. 
Rep. 758 (Ch. 1691). The dispute concerned a charter party for the hire of a ship, which con· 
tained a noncompetition clause obliging the defenda.nt to pay certain sums to the plaintiff "if the 
defendant traded in the goods the [plaintiff] company dealt in." 2 Vern. at 244, 23 Eng. Rep. at 
758. The company sought discovery of the defendant to determine if he had traded in any such 
goods. 
The defendant pleads the charter-party, by which it appears that the sums therein men· 
tioned, were of double the value of the goods themselves, and so was in the nature of a 
penalty, and that he ought not to be compelled to make a discovery by answer touching the 
same, so as to subject himself to such penalties. 
2 Vern. at 244, 23 Eng. Rep. at 758. The court rejected the defense and ordered discovery. The 
cursory report explains: "The defendant must be bound by his own agreement, having agreed it 
shall be deducted out of the freight, he ought to discover .... " 2 Vern. at 244, 23 Eng. Rep. at 
758. 
Macnair has now linked such Chancery sources to a larger set of equity cases, extending well 
back into Elizabethan times, that draw on canonist sources. Macnair, supra note 38, at 38-56; see 
also Macnair, supra note 118. 
136. Firebrass' Case, 2 Salk. 550, 91 Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1700) (granting prohibition against 
a bill of discovery in a duchy court touching the quantities of deer and timber that the chief 
ranger of a forest had taken). 
137. Francis Jenkes, 6 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1189 (1676). The report concerns an 
investigation conducted by the king and his advisors at the Council board into remarks that 
Jenkes uttered in an election campaign speech on the hustings. Wigmore includes the cases in his 
list of supposed instances of the privilege against self-incrimination because Jenkes said at one 
point that he wished "to be excused all farther answer to such questions; since the law doth 
provide, that no man be put to answer to his own prejudice." Id. at 1194. 
In truth, there was no recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination in the pretrial 
process until the nineteenth century. Levy acknowledges this point. See supra text accompany-
ing note 68. 
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any supposed privilege against self-incrimination. Only the powerful 
searchlight of hindsight makes these cases relevant to the history of 
the privilege. We may put this point in a different way by saying that, 
if the privilege had developed no further beyond the last of the trials 
that Wigmore cites, which occurred in 1685, no scholar looking over 
these eleven cases could have concluded from such inconsequential 
gleanings that a doctrine resembling the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was in force at common law. 
a. Savaging the defendant. In five of Wigmore's eleven criminal 
trials, what is treated as evidence of the common law court's recogni-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination is actually hostile behav-
ior by the trial judge intended to disadvantage the defendant. In each 
case, the event that Wigmore cites is the judge's refusal to allow the 
defendant to cross-examine an accusing witness. 138 For example, in 
the case of Nathanael Reading, 139 one of the Popish Plot defendants, 
Reading attempted to ask the sinister prosecution witness Bedloe140 
whether Bedloe was part of the supposed plot to burn Westminster. 
The presiding judge, Francis North, interferes, saying that "if you of-
fer to ask him any question upon his oath, to make him accuse him-
self, we must oppose it."141 Thus, North employed the slogan about 
not requiring a man to accuse himself for the purpose of shielding a 
prosecution witness against legitimate cross-examination. 142 In the 
138. See Titus Oates, 10 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1079, 1099, 1123 (1685); Thomas 
Rosewell, 10 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 147, 169 (1684); Earl of Castlemaine, 7 STATE 
TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1067, 1096 (1680); Richard Langhorn, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 
417, 435 (1679); Nathanael Reading, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 259, 296 (1679). A 
student's seminar paper alerted me to the point developed above in text. See Mary D. Scott, The 
Dubious Existence of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination in the Seventeenth Century (1978) 
(unpublished seminar paper, University of Chicago Law School) (on file with author). 
139. Nathanael Reading, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 259, 296. 
140. Wigmore mistakenly says that Reading was trying to cross-examine Titus Oates. The 
actual witness was Oates' coconspirator, Bedloe. These revolting characters are the subject of a 
masterful book, JOHN KENYON, THE POPISH PLOT (1972). 
141. Nathanael Reading, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 296. 
142. Recall that prosecution witnesses testified under oath while defense witnesses were for-
bidden from doing so and thus spoke unsworn, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, 
until the legislation of 1702. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. The defendant spoke 
unsworn until 1898. See supra note 30. North's reference to the oath of the prosecution witness 
may have been intended to invoke the distinction between sworn and unsworn witnesses. Under 
this interpretation, the defendant should not derive advantage from a witness testifying under 
oath, even when the testimony favorable to the defendant is elicited under cross-examination 
rather than under direct examination. 
In separate correspondence, three scholars who read a prepublication draft of this essay 
(Christopher Allen, David Brown, and Michael Macnair) have cautioned that concern with oath 
in the pretrial process played a larger role in the development of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation than our trial-centered literature has thus far recognized. Brown and Macnair each point 
to the murder trial of Sarah Malcolm, OBSP (Feb. 1733), at 90-91t, extracted in Langbein, supra 
note 8, at 283 n.58, in which the court refused to allow the prosecution to use the JP's pretrial 
examination of the defendant because it had been taken on oath. The judge said: "If [the exami-
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sixth of Wigmore's cases, it was the prosecutor rather than the judge 
who attempted to hinder the cross-examination of a defense witness. 143 
In four of Wigmore's criminal cases, the defendants were victims 
of the baseless Popish Plot prosecutions.144 In five of Wigmore's cases, 
the judges whom he treats as supposedly vindicating the privilege 
against self-incrimination were the notorious Stuart bullies, Scroggs 
and Jefferies. 145 In another of Wigmore's eleven criminal trial prece-
dents, we find Jefferies serving as prosecuting counsel, pressing upon 
the court the maxim against "ask[ing] him any questions that may 
tend to accuse himself' for the purpose of interfering with the defend-
ant's effort to conduct a cross-examination.146 Thus, most of Wig-
more's authority for this supposed seventeenth-century breakthrough 
in defensive safeguard actually instances efforts by the subservient Stu-
art bench to disadvantage defendants in baseless political and religious 
persecutions. 
b. Incidental claims. Apart from the cases previously examined, 
Wigmore points to three additional cases in which criminal defendants 
made episodic mention of an entitlement not to accuse oneself. 147 In 
nation] is upon Oath it cannot be read [at trial], for Persons are not to swear against themselves; 
all Examinations ought to be taken freely and voluntarily, and not upon Oath, and then we can 
read [th]em." OBSP (Feb. 1733), at 90-91. Beattie reports a comparable case from Surrey as-
sizes in 1743, in which, according to the pamphlet report, the defendant's pretrial confession was 
offered: 
[T]he confession was produced; but it being taken on oath, it could not be read. If it had 
been taken voluntarily it would have been admitted as good evidence; but the law supposes 
that an oath is a compulsion; and consequently that no man is obliged to swear against 
himself in cases where it affects his life. 
BEATIJE, supra note 7, at 365-66 n.129 (extracting pamphlet report of 1743). Macnair directs 
attention to Dalton's JP manual dated 1619, see DALTON, supra note 7, at 273, in which Dalton 
explains "that the accused was to be examined without oath, citing nemo tenetur for this, and this 
statement was repeated by most subsequent authors; but the accused continued to be required to 
answer incriminating questions by the justices, though not on oath, until the nineteenth century." 
Macnair, supra note 118, at 79 n.99; see also BARLOW, supra note 60; infra note 157. 
143. William Viscount Stafford, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1293, 1314 (1680). 
144. William Viscount Stafford, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1293; Earl ofCastlemaine, 
7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1067; Richard Langhorn, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 
417; Thomas Whitebread, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 311; Nathanael Reading, 7 STATE 
TRIALS, supra note 4, at 259. 
On the Popish Plot, see generally KENYON, supra note 140. For a succinct account, sec 
STEPHEN, supra note 2, at 383-92 (concluding that, "in two years, and in connection with one 
transaction, six memorable failures of justice, involving the sacrifice of no less than fourteen 
innocent lives, occurred in trials held before the highest courts of judicature under a form of 
procedure closely resembling that which is still in force amongst us"). 
145. Thomas Whitebread, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 311 (Scroggs, Lord Chief Justice 
[hereinafter LCJ]); Titus Oates, 10 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1079 (Jefferies, LCJ); Thomas 
Rosewell, 10 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 147 (Jefferies, LCJ); Earl of Castlemaine, 7 STATE 
TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1067 (Scroggs, LCJ); Richard Langhorn, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, 
at 417 (Scroggs, LCJ). Regarding Scroggs and Jefferies, see infra note 150. 
146. Dr. Oliver Plunket, 8 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 447, 480-81 (1681). 
147. Thomas White, 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 311, 361 (1679); Penn & Mead, 6 
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each of these cases, the incidental reliance upon the nemo tenetur 
maxim for not replying to a particular question is an isolated event 
during the course of a trial in which the defendant otherwise responds 
constantly to other questioning. 
3. Overview on Wigmore's Evidence 
The privilege against self-incrimination at common law did not ex-
ist during the period in which Wigmore thought he was seeing its ori-
gins. The successful campaign to topple the courts of Star Chamber 
and High Commission. and to prevent the ecclesiastical courts from 
using ex officio oath procedure made a tremendous impression on con-
temporaries, just as Wigmore thought. But, while these events did in-
deed put the slogan nemo tenetur prodere seipsum into currency as an 
abstract principle or maxim worthy of respect, this maxim had no de-
terminate meaning when applied to criminal procedure within the com-
mon law courts. That is why the bullying Stuart bench could tum the 
maxim upside down and use it as a club against the pathetic defend-
ants in the Popish Plot cases, and that is why the defendants in a 
handful of other cases chanced to mention it in the course of proceed-
ings that otherwise exhibit no fidelity to any privilege against self-
incrimination. 
D. Wigmore's Reservations 
Having located what he thought to be the origins of the common 
law privilege in the seventeenth-century authorities, Wigmore had the 
marvelous good sense to record serious doubts about his own conclu-
sion. His follower, Levy, displays no such circumspection. Levy de-
picts the modem Anglo-American privilege against self-incrimination 
as such an obvious historical inevitability that the only puzzle is to 
wonder why it took the dummies so long to see the light. 148 
1. The Stuart Connection 
Wigmore was perplexed "that the privilege, thus established, 
comes into full recognition under the judges of the restored Stuarts, 
and not under the parliamentary reformers." 149 Wigmore sensed the 
irony inherent in his view of the development of the privilege against 
self-incrimination at common law. An event that has come to be un-
STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 951, 957 (1670); John Crook, 6 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 
201, 205 (1662); Adrian Scroop, 5 STATE TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1034, 1039 (1660). 
148. For example, "[a]lthough the legal profession customarily refers to the right against 
self-incrimination as a 'privilege,' I call it a 'right' because it is one." LEVY, supra note 53, at vii. 
149. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 125, § 2250, at 290. 
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derstood in historical perspective as among the most distinctive attrib-
utes of defensive safeguard in the whole of our criminal procedural 
tradition was, on Wigmore's view of it, the handiwork of the notori-
ously craven late-Stuart bench. The judges who supposedly created 
the privilege at common law were Scroggs, Jefferies, and their brethren 
- men whose names are synonymous with subservience to the crown 
and murderous unfairness to criminal defendants.150 I find it difficult 
to imagine that a group of judges who displayed such hostility toward 
criminal defendants would simultaneously have been so alert to recog-
nize and enforce a novel and dissonant measure of defensive safeguard. 
Levy, unlike Wigmore, was untroubled to find himself celebrating 
the spectacle of the late-Stuart judiciary serving as the engine that 
crafted the privilege. Indeed, it is the Popish Plot trials, which were as 
manifest a persecution of innocent people as ever occurred at common 
law, that move Levy to exult in "how scrupulously the courts adhered 
to the right against self-incrimination."1s1 
2. Judicial Indifference 
Wigmore noticed how tentative the supposed privilege against self-
incrimination was in the hands of the very judges who supposedly rec-
ognized it. Referring to the behavior of the bench in the seventeenth-
century State Trials, his primary resource, Wigmore remarked that 
150. On Scroggs and Jefferies, see BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 274-
77, 466-67 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1984); 6 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 504-08, 527-30 (2d ed. 1937); compare the adulatory G.W. KEETON, LORD CHANCELLOR 
JEFFREYS AND THE STUART CAUSE 24-25 (1965). On the judicial politics of the era, see Alfred 
F. Havighurst, James JI and the Twelve Men in Scarlet, 69 LAW Q. REV. 522 (1953); Alfred F. 
Havighurst, The Judiciary and Politics in the Reign of Charles IL 66 LAW Q. REV. 62, 229 
(1950). 
151. LEVY, supra note 53, at 318. Levy seems to think that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was part of a broader movement of safeguard in the seventeenth century. He admits that 
the "adversary system in criminal proceedings had always been a one-sided affair, with the crown 
enjoying advantages denied to the accused. Procedural reforms of the very late seventeenth cen-
tury redressed the imbalance, giving to the accused a greater measure of parity." Id. at 320-21. 
He mentions compulsory process in 1696 and 1701 and copy of the indictment and right to 
counsel in 1696 and thereafter. Id. at 321-23. "Accordingly, by the early eighteenth century 
both judicial and statutory alterations in procedure made it possible for a defendant to present 
his defense through witnesses and by counsel. As a result ... he was no longer obliged to speak 
out personally in order to get his story before the jury .... " Id. at 323. Thus, claims Levy, "[b)y 
the early eighteenth century, the [privilege against self incrimination] prevailed supreme in all 
[trial] proceedings .... " Id. at 325. 
Levy is correct to notice that the Treason Act of 1696 entailed a fundamental movement 
toward more balanced criminal procedure. What he overlooks is the highly exceptional charac-
ter of the Act. The reforms applied to a minuscule subset of cases, prosecutions for treason. The 
object of the 1696 legislation was to do criminal procedural business as usual except for treason. 
See supra text accompanying notes 41, 49-50, 86-91. The momentous change for the history of 
ordinary criminal procedure was the allowance of defense counsel, which occurred as a trickle in 
the 1730s and which does not seem to have unsettled the basic "accused speaks" trial until well 
into the second half of the eighteenth century. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96. 
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the supposed privilege against self-incrimination "remained not much 
more than a bare rule of law, which the judges would recognize on 
demand. The spirit of it was wanting in them. The old habit of ques-
tioning and urging the accused died hard - did not disappear, indeed, 
until the 1700s had begun."152 This is Wigmore's way of noticing 
that, even in the handful of cases that contain supposed authority for 
his view that there was a seventeenth-century privilege against self-
incrimination, the evidence is at most an isolated reference to the priv-
ilege in the course of a trial at which the defendant otherwise replied 
routinely to the accusations against him. 
3. Failure of Constitutionalization 
When the age of safeguard in common law criminal procedure ac-
tually dawned, the English displayed a peculiar disinterest in securing 
the privilege against self-incrimination among their landmark safe-
guards. As Wigmore observed, "[i]n all the parliamentary remon-
strances and petitions and declarations that preceded the expulsion of 
the Stuarts, [the privilege against self-incrimination] does not any-
where appear." 153 The privilege "was not worth mentioning to the 
English constitution-menders of 1689," that is, in the Bill of Rights of 
1689.154 I would add in a similar vein that it is even more revealing 
that the determined Whig reformers of the 1690s, who drafted that 
great catalog of procedural safeguards for the Treason Act of 1696,155 
found no room to include the supposed privilege against self-incrimi-
nation among the protections that they valued. 
E. Overview on a Historical Error 
How could a historical writer so sensitive to the sources and to the 
subject as Wigmore have erred by a century in identifying the origins 
of the privilege against self-incrimination? Wigmore did not fabricate. 
The nemo tenatur slogan did indeed gain currency during the Tudor-
Stuart constitutional struggles. Wigmore in effect traced some of the 
history of the use of the slogan. The key insight, however, is that the 
slogan did not make the privilege; it was the privilege, which devel-
oped much later, that absorbed and perpetuated the slogan. The an-
cestry of the privilege has been mistakenly projected backwards upon 
the slogan, whereas the privilege against self-incrimination in common 
152. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 125, § 2250, at 291 (footnote omitted). 
153. Id. at 292 (footnote omitted). 
154. Id. 
155. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3; see also supra text accompanying notes 84-92 (discussing the Act). 
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law criminal procedure was, in truth, the achievement of defense 
counsel in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Without defense counsel, a criminal defendant's right to remain 
silent was the right to forfeit any defense; indeed, in a system that 
emphasized capital punishment, the right to remain silent was literally 
the right to commit suicide. Only when defense counsel succeeded in 
restructuring the criminal trial to make it possible to silence the ac-
cused did it also become possible to fashion the true privilege against 
self-incrimination at common law. 
CONCLUSION 
I have been tempted to speak in a shorthand of sorts, in order to 
make the pithy claim that the theme of this essay is that there was no 
privilege against self-incrimination in common law criminal procedure 
during the early modem epoch - until, that is, the late eighteenth 
century. Formulating the claim in this way almost captures what has 
been shown, yet it would neglect an important strand. The core value 
of the privilege against self-incrimination was indeed on the lips of 
those whose words have found their way into the conventional but 
misguided historical account of the supposed Tudor-Stuart origins of 
the privilege. 
The better way to encapsulate the theme of this essay is not to say 
that there was no privilege, but rather to recognize that the structure 
of criminal procedure in the early modem epoch made it impossible to 
implement the privilege. The "accused speaks" criminal trial stood in 
perpetual tension with any notion of a right to remain silent. The 
privilege against self-incrimination became functional only as a conse-
quence of the revolutionary reconstruction of the criminal trial 
worked by the advent of defense counsel and adversary criminal pro-
cedure. The privilege as we understand it is an artifact of the adver-
sary system of criminal procedure. The error has been to expect to 
find the privilege in operation before the adversary system was in 
place. 
Across the centuries the privilege against self-incrimination has 
changed character profoundly, from the original privilege not to ac-
cuse oneself to the modem privilege not to respond or to testify. Many 
policies have come to be associated with the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Indeed, Wigmore enumerated a full dozen for his trea-
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tise. 156 They range from the prohibition on torturing the accused157 (a 
reform that had been achieved before the first traces of the privilege at 
common law158), to the modem American rule forbidding adverse 
comment on the accused's silence159 (a rule so recent, 160 historically 
speaking, that the ink is still wet). But the core value of the privilege, 
the accused's right not to speak, presupposes an effective right to have 
another speak in the accused's stead. In our legal history, that right 
was the achievement of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. 
156. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 125, § 2251, at 297, 310-18. 
157. Barlow's JP manual of 1745 makes the connection between not torturing and the nemo 
tenetur maxim: 
The Law of England is a Law of Mercy, and does not use the Rack or Torture to compel 
Criminals to accuse themselves; since these Methods are cruel, and at the same Time uncer-
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